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‘[W]e need to work on overthrowing the Horthy-rule. This is 
not going to happen without outside pressure and actions: 
  [...] people have almost messianic expectations from Prague 
and Vienna, from you and from us, waiting for [liberation]. 
Vilmos Böhm to Mihály Károlyi (Vienna, 3 September 1920)1 
 
‘The backbone of my policy is a full agreement with the 
Czechs. I can regard President Beneš, whom I know  
for over 20 years, as a personal friend.’ 
Mihály Károlyi to a Soviet diplomat (London, 8 June 1943)2 
Abstract: This paper defines the main objectives, stages, and the dy-
namics of the secret cooperation of the democratic Hungarian opposi-
tion, hostile to the Horthy regime, with the government of Czecho-
slovakia. It focuses on the Prague’s contacts with Hungary’s Octob-
rists, social democrats (active both within the country and in exile) and 
liberals. The paper covers mostly the period of the so-called consolida-
tion of the Horthy regime, carried out under the leadership of Prime 
Minister István Bethlen. Our research concludes that the struggle of 
the democratic opposition against the Horthy-Bethlen regime was con-
sistently encouraged by Czechoslovak political and diplomatic circles. 
The collaboration between anti-Horthyist groups and Prague was parti-
cularly intense in 1919–1921 and in 1930–1931. Our study utilises 
hitherto unknown documents from archives in Prague and Budapest, to 
re-evaluate the causes of interwar tensions between Hungary and 
Czechoslovakia — beyond their disputes over borders and disagree-
ments over the treatment of minorities. 
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Following the dissolution of Austria-Hungary and a series of revoluti-
onary upheavals after the end of World War I, an authoritarian rule 
under the regency of Miklós Horthy was established in Hungary in 
1920. This conservative and nationalist regime forced its most ardent 
domestic opponents to make a choice between a recognition of the 
new government and emigration (mostly to neighbouring countries). 
But the consolidation of the 'counter-revolution', as the circle around 
Horthy proudly called their rule, did not eradicate the opposition in the 
country. Relying on the public discontent with the Horthy’s regency 
and with the support provided by foreign governments and political 
parties, Hungarian oppositionists continued their attempts to democra-
tise Hungary throughout the 1920s. It was the neighbouring Czecho-
slovak Republic (hereafter the ČSR) that provided most active support 
to the anti-Horthyist circles, and this article strives to uncover the story 
of the Czechoslovaks’ secret actions. 
The official relations between Budapest and Prague in the in-
terwar period were far from trouble-free. The most important reason 
for their disagreements was a territorial dispute over Slovakia and Sub-
carpathian Ruthenia, which had belonged to Hungary until the end of 
the Great War. After these lands were incorporated into the ČSR in 
1918–1921, the vast majority of Hungary’s political establishment 
looked forward their full or partial return. Budapest authorities main-
tained strong ties with anti-Prague opposition movements in Slovakia 
and Subcarpathian Ruthenia, particularly among local Magyars. More-
over, Prague also had its own claims against Budapest (which con-
cerned certain territories and the position of Slovaks in Hungary), and, 
apparently, it even saw Hungary as its potential sphere of influence. 
The Prague-Budapest tensions reached their zenith during the border 
rectifications in Slovakia and Ruthenia in 1938–1939. 
The reading of the interwar realities through the prism of 
“mixture of border and ethnic conflicts” seems to simplify the complex 
relations between the post-WWI Czechoslovakia and Hungary. It ig-
nores the fact that both states were uninterested in escalating their dis-
putes excessively. Budapest had to take into consideration that Czech-
oslovakia far exceeded Hungary in terms of military potential and was 
a member of the Little Entente – a military and political bloc that 
guaranteed the ČSR Yugoslav and Romanian aid against Hungary. 
Furthermore, the ČSR was Hungary's second-largest trade partner be-
hind Austria, meaning that a rise of strife between them would greatly 
damage the Horthyist economy. Prague, in turn, could not be sure that 
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the population of its eastern provinces would remain loyal in case of 
war and feared the possible interference of other regional states in the 
conflict. In this context, and despite their numerous disagreements, 
both Prague and Budapest worked towards the bilateral normalisation. 
But, whenever diplomacy could not deliver desired results, the two 
governments applied various soft power instruments of pressure on 
each other, spreading the hostile propaganda or secretly supporting the 
political opposition on the other side of the shared border. 
Foreign interferences in domestic affairs, especially regarding 
the interwar Central Europe, are often associated with the activities of 
national minorities. The classical examples are the German or Magyar 
minorities that sought a protection from Berlin or from Budapest re-
spectively, to counter-balance the power of majority.3 In the case of 
Hungary-Czechoslovakia relations, a lot of scholarly attention has 
been paid to the contacts between the Hungarian authorities and the 
opponents of Prague among the Slovak and Magyar political parties in 
the ČSR.4 While some historians see these relations as ‘justified’ and 
‘natural,’ other condemn them. Labelled as the Horthyist interference 
in the internal affairs of Czechoslovakia, these relations were des-
cribed as proof of Budapest’ and national minorities ‘aggressive’ and 
‘disloyal’ attitude to the Czechoslovak state, and considered one of 
key reasons for persistent tensions between Budapest and Prague. 
As the number of Slovaks in post-Trianon Hungary did not 
reach 200 thousand, and were speedily Magyarised, ‘national-minded’ 
historians failed to notice a ‘pro-Czechoslovak strata’ inside the Hun-
garian political scene. Despite that the counter-revolutionary regime in 
Hungary was challenged by a wide front of oppositional groups, the 
issue of collaboration between these anti-Horthyist circles and the 
government in Prague remains little studied.5 This paper aims to over-
come this gap by giving an outline of the stages, events, and substance 
of the partnership between the Magyar democrats and the Czechoslo-
vak diplomacy. Also, it seeks to contribute to the scholarship by sug-
gesting that it is not necessarily the ‘national minority’ which acted as 
an third pillar in the bilateral relations of neighbouring states, but ra-
ther the united opposition movement.  
The scarcity of preserved primary sources is one of main prob-
lems for studying ‘secret cooperation’ between the opposition move-
ments and foreign governments. Aware of potential danger of present-
ing proofs of such cooperation, which could be used either as proof of 
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‘foreign interference,’ ‘political venality’ or ‘national treason,’ the in-
volved parties tended to convey information on their plans and activi-
ties with the minimum of written records.6 For example, when the 
Czechoslovak representative in Budapest, Milan Hodža, cabled to Pra-
gue in August 1919 that he would provide details which kind of action 
should be taken regarding the republican parties with pro-Czech orien-
tation in Hungary only during his next visit to Prague.7 The question of 
financial subsidies was hidden with special diligence, and sources con-
tain only allusions to it.8 Otherwise, the Hungarian journals were full 
of different accusations against the opposition parties of accepting for-
eign funds, but it is almost impossible to verify them. For example, in 
December 1930, the rightist press in Budapest published several letters 
apparently exchanged between Hungarian socialist party leaders and 
their Czechoslovak partners. The letters showed that the ČSR had been 
supplying the social democrats with money for their political struggle.9 
Due to these scarcities or biases of sources, speculations about rela-
tions between the Hungarian opposition and the governmental circles 
of Prague, and especially the funds involved, remain a very slippery 
area for research. 
At the same time, there is enough evidence of the existence of 
‘special relationship’ between the Hungarian democrats and the 
Czechoslovak authorities. First, the Hungarian émigrés maintained 
extensive correspondence among them, and the letters of such figures 
as Mihály Karolyi, Oszkár Jászi or Vilmos Böhm contain multiple ref-
erences to Prague’s support of their anti-Horthyist struggle. Second, 
the Czech sources also mirror these relations. On one hand, they testify 
to the extent of Prague’s support for the ‘democratisation’ of Hungary, 
and the place that this issue occupied in official diplomatic relations 
between Budapest and Prague. Finally, as the Horthyist regime kept an 
open eye on the Czechoslovak relations of its domestic opponents, and 
documents housed in the National Archives of Hungary shed some 
additional light on this intricate problem. 
Another challenge in studying unofficial relations between a 
foreign state and Hungarian domestic opposition lays in terminology. 
The word choice probably would be a reason for critique always as the 
distinction between institutional or personal cooperation and hidden 
manipulation is often very subtle. How to differentiate a foreign aid 
from a foreign interference? Should the Czechoslovak financial assis-
tance to pay the legal fees during the trials over the social-democrats in 
Hungary10 be considered a justified reason to call the anti-Horthyist 
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activists ‘agents’ of the Czechoslovak Foreign Minister Edvard Beneš? 
Or should repeated Czechoslovak promises to encourage the establish-
ment of ‘democratic governance’ in Budapest be understood as Pra-
gue’s intention to meddle in internal affairs of a neighbouring country? 
Much less innocent seems to be a Beneš advise to the left-wing émi-
grés to put an end to the counter-revolutionary regime by an ‘outright 
rebellion’ in 1920, or Prague’s enthusiasm about the right-wing radical 
István Friedrich’s plans in 1932 to stage a coup to overthrow Horthy.  
 Leaving the clarification of these and many other issues for 
future research, this paper argues that the Hungarian democratic circles 
maintained partnership with the governmental spheres in Prague 
throughout the 1920s and that this relationship strongly affected the 
internal politics in Hungary as well as bilateral Prague-Budapest dip-
lomatic relations. This research also concludes that the intensity of the 
collaboration between the anti-Horthyist opposition in the ČSR in the 
1920s depended mostly on, first, the stability (or a lack thereof) of 
Horthy’s regime, and, second, on the level of cordiality between cabi-
nets in Budapest and Prague. Whenever the counter-revolutionary au-
thorities had to confront a serious internal or external challenge, the 
opposition would increase its pressure on the Horthy regime, pushing 
it to loosen its authoritarian grip and carry out democratic reforms. 
However, Prague provided support to the opposition only upon a seri-
ous consideration of the potential consequences, and the paper con-
cludes that the Hungarian opposition could not count on an unqualified 
Czechoslovak support against the Horthy regime. 
The paper focuses on the 1920s and early 1930s, covering the 
period of the so-called consolidation in Hungary (1921–1931), carried 
out under the leadership of regent Horthy's closest political ally – 
Count István Bethlen. For one decade, the political system of the Hun-
garian 'kingdom without a king' remained surprisingly stable; its sym-
bol, apart from regent Horthy, was the long-standing Prime Minister, 
István Bethlen. This Transylvanian aristocrat, who became head of the 
government after the (ex-) King Charles IV Habsburg had attempted a 
failed coup in March 1921, retained the reins of power until August 
1931. The consolidation decade became so inextricably linked with the 
Prime Minister's name that foreign diplomats used to call the Hungari-
an ruling regime not only Horthyist, but also Bethlenist.11 
Throughout the 1920s, the camp opposed to the Horthy-
Bethlen duo may be divided into three main groups: 1. democrats 
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(composed in turn of the so-called liberals who were proponents of 
democratic reforms; Octobrists – supporters of the Aster Revolution of 
1918; and social democrats); 2. legitimists (who were calling for a 
Habsburg restoration); and 3. ultra-right nationalists. All three oppose-
tion groups rejected the consolidation policy to various extent. On the 
one hand, the Magyarországi Szociáldemokrata Párt (Social Demo-
cratic Party of Hungary, hereafter MSZDP) and the Octobrists (whose 
leaders were in exile), as well as the largest liberal parties (Vilmos 
Vázsonyi's Nemzeti Demokrata Párt (National Democratic Party, here-
after NDP), Károly Rassay's Party, as well as the Kossuth Party) prin-
cipally opposed the government; on the other hand, many of the legit-
imists and radical nationalists (united around Gyula Gömbös) were in 
favour of a peaceful coexistence with the regime. Part of the opposi-
tion existed on the edge of legality: for instance, the Magyarországi 
Szocialista Munkáspárt (Socialist Workers Party of Hungary), which 
in 1925–1928 acted as a cover for the illegal Communist Party of 
Hungary; or the so-called Republican Party, repeatedly banned by the 
authorities in the 1920s. The situation was further complicated by the 
fact that both the democratic and the legitimist opposition saw as their 
main political opponents not Bethlen's clique, but rather Gömbös and 
his followers. The democrats disliked his chauvinism, anti-Semitism, 
and anti-socialism (Gömbös was seen as responsible for many of the 
'white terror' killings), while the legitimists were averse to his anti-
Habsburg position. Although the democrats and the legitimists held 
opposing views on many social and political matters, they were united 
in their demand for a ‘democratisation’ of the counter-revolutionary 
regime by means of a universal secret suffrage.12 
Hungarian democratic groups carefully maintained connec-
tions with ideologically close movements and political circles abroad. 
The MSZDP was a member of the Second International and was well 
connected to influential socialist parties abroad, such as those of Great 
Britain, France, Austria, and the ČSR,13 while the Kossuth Party mem-
bers were very active in the Pan-Europe movement.14Apart from these 
direct contacts, the Hungarian democrats maintained relations with 
foreign partners through the left-wing émigrés who had left the coun-
try during the white terror in 1919–1920.15 Initially, a majority of these 
refugees fled to Austria, but at the height of the Hungarian crisis, the 
ČSR opened its borders to some of them. The Czechoslovak envoy in 
Vienna, Robert Flieder, reported to Prague in January 1920 that the 
opportunity to obtain asylum in the ČSR put newly-exiled Magyars in 
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a pro-Czechoslovak mood. Flieder noted that the émigrés, who hated 
the counter-revolutionary abuses of power, repeatedly offered their 
services to Prague; thus, it became clear which among them could be-
come future intermediaries in the reconciliation between Czechoslo-
vakia and Hungary.16 
By the early 1920s the ČSR had become one of the main safe 
havens for the leftist Hungarian émigrés (apart from the Octobrists 
Mihály Károlyi, József Diner-Dénes, and Rezső Krejcsi, and many 
former Magyar Communists, like Ignác Schultz; intellectuals such as 
Lajos Bartha, Pál Ignotus and Jenő Gömöri also settled there), some of 
whom became involved in Czechoslovak politics (Hungarian cadres 
occupied top positions in the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia).17 
The second wave of the Hungarian political emigration to Czechoslo-
vakia happened after stifling the February 1934 rebellion in Austria 
that forced Magyar social-democrats to seek new asylum (such as 
Vilmos Böhm, Jenő Horovitz, Pál Oroszlán, and Pál Szende). Among 
the political refugees, the move to the ČSR was made much easier for 
those who had the official residence in Northern Hungary (Slovakia or 
in Subcarpathian Ruthenia) before 1918, and, thus, had a formal right 
for Czechoslovak citizenship. However, the Czechoslovak asylum was 
not as sure as the Hungarian émigrés may hope. When relations with 
the Horthy regime were improving, Prague was inclined to loosen its 
connections with the Magyar democrats. In 1920, in the background of 
the normalisation of official Prague-Budapest relations, Karolyi was 
invited to leave the republic. Many other Hungarian exiles also left the 
ČSR. Similarly, those left-wing Hungarians, who were criticizing the 
Czechoslovak regime, were under the threat of expulsion. The ‘émi-
gré’ left-wing activist Lajos Surányi, who was even elected to the Pra-
gue parliament, was expelled as ‘foreigner’ to Hungary in 1929, and 
became a zealous critique of the ‘Czechoslovak democracy.’ While the 
Czechoslovak reception of refugees from Hungary laid foundations for 
collaboration between Prague and the anti-Horthyist movement,18 the 
importance of exiled Hungarian diaspora in the ČSR had significantly 
weakened by the end of the interwar period. 
The Hungarian frondeurs made the Czechoslovak Republic 
one of the main pillars of their activity for several reasons. First, the 
disputes between official Prague and Budapest, although put on the 
back burner, allowed the Hungarian opposition to view the ČSR as a 
potential ally against the counter-revolutionary regime. Second, anti-
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Horthyist and Czechoslovak circles had reasons for mutual sympathy: 
Hungarians were attracted to the ČSR as the foremost 'democratic' 
state in the Danubian basin, while the Hungarian democrats' pleas for 
aid against the Horthyist ‘oppression’ found a deep resonance among 
the Czechoslovak socialists.19 As a MSZDP authority Ernő Garami 
argued, the rapprochement with two democratic neighbours, Czecho-
slovakia and Austria, had to strengthen the democratization of Hunga-
ry.20 Otherwise, the promoters of the orientation towards Prague usual-
ly stressed the economic interdependence between the former Habs-
burg lands, especially Hungary, Austria and Czechoslovakia.21  
As the influence of the Magyar democratic emigration was 
diminishing throughout the 1920s, the role of the domestic opposition 
to the counter-revolutionary rule was increasing. The main base for 
independent political activity in Hungary was the Budapest Parliament 
itself, to whose liberties Regent Horthy still showed outward respect. 
The government reported to the parliament, which passed laws and 
approved the budget. However, thanks to a series of machinations and 
abuses of power by the Horthyist administration, the pro-government 
Egységes Párt (Unified Party; headed by Bethlen) repeatedly won 
two-thirds of all seats (in 1922, 1926, and 1931), which gave it full 
control of the legislative branch.22 As a result, the opposition did not 
regard the parliament as a fully legitimate legislative body. After the 
1922 elections, the joint committee of the democratic deputies adopted 
a declaration stating that ‘the National Assembly and its activities are 
… unlawful.’23 
The most influential among the democratic parties was the 
MSZDP, but its political prestige slowly but steadily decreased. It 
reached what was probably the peak of its power during the winter of 
1918–1919, when the party (according to its own statistics) counted as 
many as 1,5 million members.24 Up until the mid-1930s, the MSZDP 
had the largest opposition faction in the parliament: it won 25 seats in 
1922, 14 seats in 1926, and 11 in 1931; in the meantime, all the liberal 
parties put together counted circa 10 seats. In the elections of 1922, in 
which the democratic opposition won more votes than at any other 
point during the interwar period, the MSZDP received over 300 thou-
sand votes (200 thousand in Budapest alone), while the liberals gained 
100 thousand votes.25 In the early 1930s, when the democrats lost part 
of their popularity, the MSZDP counted circa 50 thousand members,26 
while the NDP and Rassay's party had only 25–30 thousand and 14–15 
thousand members, respectively.27 With the decline of the left parties’ 
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popularity, by the early 1930s the right-wing Független Kisgazdapárt 
(Independent Smallholders’ Party) became the main opposition force 
inside Hungary. The new face of the parliamentary opposition – the 
Smallholder leader Tibor Echkardt also inherited the label of a ‘bribed 
Czech traitor’ from his adversaries.28 
The alleged Czechoslovak financial assistance to the Hungari-
an opposition was the main reason to call the democratic parties 
‘Beneš or Little Entente agents,’29 but it seems that these parties pri-
marily sought to cover their expenses with donations made by their 
members. Concurrently, they did not refuse outside aid when it was 
offered. The liberals, for instance, could rely on financial aid from 
Hungarian banks and trade and commercial associations (such as 
ТÉВЕ, GYOSZ, and ОМКЕ), which were interested in lobbying the 
democrats' programme of regional economic cooperation. According 
to the historian Zsuzsa Nagy, the Hungarian democrats could also 
count on subsidies from the Rotary Club, the Fabian Society, the Pan-
European Movement, the Hungarian section of the League for Human 
Rights (headed in Paris by Mihály Károlyi), and the freemasonry.30 
The uprooted left-wing exiles were economically more vul-
nerable than their home fellows. Thus, the acquiring of stable revenue 
became a major issue for their existence. ‘The Program for the Emi-
gration’ prepared by Oszkár Jászi in 1919, which called for the unity 
of the anti-Horthyist leaders outside Hungary, stipulated that the émi-
gré community could accept the financial backing from foreign states 
and private persons only with the assent of its all members.31 Never-
theless, the unification of leftist exile groups, not speaking about the 
entire Hungarian democratic opposition, was never achieved and it 
seems that their revenue streams remained unknown for each other. 
The rumours that the Czechoslovaks were providing financial 
support to the Hungarian opposition were not completely unfounded. 
Sources indicate that the ČSR social-democrats assisted their Hungari-
an comrades, and that the Prague government supported opposition 
press both in exile (the Viennese Bécsi Magyar Újság and Új Ma-
gyarok)32 and inside Hungary (such as the Világ). The Czechs offered 
loans and distribution on the territory of republic. In the early 1930s, 
even the influential Budapest newspaper Pesti Napló approached 
Beneš for a financial help needed to propagate Czech-Hungarian rec-
onciliation.33 Apart from the loans, the Hungarian opposition tried to 
establish a more legal way of obtaining the financial help from Czech-
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oslovakia. In 1921, the representatives of a ‘liberal block’ in Hungary 
proposed the Czechoslovak Foreign Ministry to grant their commercial 
partners certain trading concessions.34 Ten years later, a similar de-
mand was formulated at Prague by another promoter of the Czech-
Hungarian rapprochement Gusztáv Gratz.35 Nevertheless, it seems that 
the interwar right-wing speculations about the amount of Czech subsi-
dies for the Hungarian opposition were largely overestimated. 
 
 
Prague and the Magyar democrats facing the counter-revolution 
in Hungary, August 1919–December 1921. 
 
Many interwar contacts between the political establishment of Prague 
and the democratic forces of Budapest were rooted in the history of the 
Dual Monarchy. Some relations originated from the pre-war social-
democratic networks, others were established in the halls of the Buda-
pest parliament, or originated from common schooling. What was 
probably equally important is that during the First World War, the 
Czech and Hungarian democratic opposition set up clandestine con-
nections with the Allies, hoping for outside assistance. The Czecho-
slovak National Council – instituted in 1916 in Paris by the émigrés, a 
former Reichstag MP Professor Tomáš Garrigue Masaryk and his dis-
ciple Edvard Beneš – in the summer of 1918 received the Allies' 
recognition as the basis for a future Czechoslovak government. On 14 
November 1918, Masaryk was elected president of the ČSR (to be 
reelected in 1920, 1927, and 1934), while Beneš became his irreplace-
able Foreign Minister (1918–1935). In turn, Count Mihály Károlyi – 
leader of the Hungarian democratic opposition, who headed a Suffrage 
block in 1917 that included the leaders of the Radical party (Oszkár 
Jászi), Social Democrats (Manó Buchinger and Ernő Garami), and 
Vázsonyi from the NDP – also maintained secret contacts with the Al-
lies and openly called for a break between the Habsburg Monarchy 
and Germany and for an immediate peace.36  
In 1918, the Hungarian opposition tried to renew its liaisons 
with the Czech left-wing politicians. In late October 1918, Buchinger 
met with the influential Czech socialist Vlastimil Tusar in Vienna, 
hoping to reach an agreement on future peaceful relations between 
Prague and Budapest, both of which were on the verge of revolu-
tions.37 Following the victorious Aster Revolution in Budapest on 23–
31 October 1918, led by Károlyi, and the establishment of a 'People's 
Hungarian Democrats and the Czechoslovak Authorities 
1919-32 
  
31
Republic' in Hungary, Budapest exchanged official representatives 
with Prague (where independence was proclaimed on 28 October). A 
primary objective in building good relations with Czechoslovakia was 
the need to obtain coal deliveries from the Silesian mines, and in No-
vember 1918, Buchinger arrived to Prague for ‘coal negotiations.’ As a 
consequence, and under pressure from the Allies, Károlyi approved the 
transfer of Slovakia to Czechoslovak administration in December 
1918, thus creating conditions for further normalisation of Hungaro-
Czechoslovak relations. However, in March 1919 the Octobrist regime 
in Budapest was replaced by Béla Kun's 'Soviet Republic'. Károlyi and 
many of his adherents were removed from power and persecuted. 
Prague's reaction to the creation of the Hungarian commune 
was uncompromisingly negative: Czechoslovak troops moved into 
Hungary and occupied the Subcarpathian Ruthenia. Next, Masaryk 
suggested to Beneš to obtain approval of the Paris Peace Conference 
for an occupation of Budapest by the Czechoslovak army. Old Hun-
garian elites opposed the communist regime too, and several counter-
revolutionary centres were created in Vienna and in the south-east of 
Hungary, under the protection of South-Slav and French troops. 
In summer 1919, Károlyi settled in the ČSR. There, he met 
regularly with Masaryk, Beneš, and Tusar (Prime Minister of the ČSR 
in 1919–1920), coordinating the activity of the Magyar democrats in 
exile. Czech leaders assured Károlyi (as well as Oszkár Jászi – a fre-
quent visitor from Vienna) that the ČSR would support the creation of 
a democratic government in Hungary. Masaryk and Beneš repeatedly 
stated that they would be ready to make territorial concessions to 
'friendly' and 'non-reactionary' authorities in Budapest and restitute the 
Magyar-populated Schütt Island (Žitný ostrov) in Slovakia to Hunga-
ry.38 Prague's promises to assist the return of the émigrés to Budapest 
tied the Octobrists’ hopes to Czechoslovak diplomatic successes. 
On 1 August 1919, the Soviet government in Budapest was 
replaced with a moderate socialist cabinet led by Gyula Peidl. Masaryk 
immediately ordered Milan Hodža to go to Budapest as the ČSR repre-
sentative.39 However, on 6 August power passed into the hands of 
István Friedrich, who proclaimed his allegiance to József Habsburg. 
Romania, whose troops were occupying Budapest, took this de facto 
Habsburg restoration calmly, but the authorities in Prague were dis-
concerted. Tusar, fearing a further monarchical consolidation in Hun-
gary, kept trying to persuade the Hungarian envoy, Rezső Krejcsi, that 
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a republican form of government had to be preserved in Hungary.40 
Meanwhile, Beneš petitioned the Paris Peace Conference not to recog-
nize Friedrich's pro-Habsburg cabinet, instead advising to replace it 
with a 'national democratic government'. In order to achieve that Beneš 
was ready to provide troops.41 
The Allies declined the offer of a Czech intervention of Buda-
pest but convinced Friedrich to disavow his loyalty to József Habsburg 
and, on 15 August, assign the position of Foreign Minister to the Oc-
tobrist Márton Lovászi, who maintained close links with Garami, 
Buchinger, Vázsonyi, and Hodža.42 As Hodža explained in his report 
to Prague, the Lovászy group was a ‘lesser evil’ on the Hungarian po-
litical scene, which he wanted to support against Friedrich. Hodža 
even suggested to the Inter-Allied Military Mission that had arrived to 
Budapest to appoint Lovászy the Prime Minister instead of Friedrich.43 
What was probably most important is that in Hodža’s words ‘Lovászy 
and Garami showed their will to recognize immediately the new fron-
tiers already established by the peace conference.’44 On 11 September 
1919, Friedrich dismissed Lovászi,45 but Czechoslovak diplomacy still 
hoped that he may be brought back to power. On 30 September, Hodža 
reported to Prague that he ‘urged Lovászi’s group to action.’46 
Prague was not ready to relinquish its plan to change the situa-
tion in Budapest in its favour. On 13 October 1919, Beneš assured 
Jászi that the ČSR would not allow a de jure recognition of Friedrich's 
cabinet and, 'if necessary', would even to launch a military expedition 
against him. At the same time, Beneš admitted that Miklós Horthy, 
who could rely on his own army, was even more dangerous than Frie-
drich. As an alternative to Friedrich and Horthy with their revanchist 
intentions, Jászi proposed his own concept of Danubian cooperation, 
which was supposed to unite Hungarians, Czechs, Austrians, and Yu-
goslavs, allowing for a development of economy and democracy in the 
region (although under the Czech leadership).47 A couple of days later 
Beneš informed the Paris Peace Conference that Hungarian politicians 
had managed to draw up a plan of instituting a multi-party government 
in Budapest (consisting of democrats, socialists, and agrarians), which 
would function under the protection of Romanian and Czechoslovak 
troops. This shadow government intended to dissolve Horthy's army, 
sign a peace treaty with the Allies in the name of Hungary, and create 
an economic bloc with the ČSR, Yugoslavia, and Austria.48 
Participants of the Paris Peace Conference approved of the 
idea of a coalition cabinet in Hungary, but decided to supervise direct-
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ly its creation. In October–November 1919, the Entente sent the Brit-
ish diplomat Sir George Clerk (recently appointed as the first British 
envoy in Prague). However, Clerk did not focus on bringing back the 
Octobrists to power, but only on assuring the participation of the so-
cial-democrats in a new multi-party government in Budapest. The 
democratic forces perceived the Clerk mission and the issue of recon-
ciliation with the counter-revolutionaries without much hope, but the 
opinions whether to join a new government or not were divided. For 
instance, inside MSZDP, Garami opposed it, but another party leader, 
Károly Peyer, supported it. By the end of November, Clerk managed 
to obtain the resignation of Friedrich's cabinet, withdrawal of the Ro-
manian troops, and the formation of a coalition government, which 
was dominated by counter-revolutionaries but also included members 
of the MSZDP (Peyer) and the NDP. The new cabinet, led by Károly 
Huszár, was de facto recognized by the Allies and invited to the peace 
conference. Even though the social democrats had joined the govern-
ment, they were loosing their positions under the ‘white terror’ perse-
cutions. On 17 December, Hodža, reporting to Prague, wrote that the 
MSZDP would not be a powerful factor any more, but he added that a 
delegation of Hungarian republicans was preparing to leave for Pra-
gue.49 At the same time, Garami, who had escaped to Vienna, was 
convincing the Czechoslovak representative Flieder that the left and 
right wings’ reconciliation in Budapest would prove to be short-lived. 
Assuring that the MSZDP would soon pull out of the government, 
Garami entreated the ČSR not to establish economic relations with 
Hungary until its citizens were guaranteed democratic rights.50 Garami 
turned out to be right: as Horthy's 'white terror' continued, Peyer left 
the government in January 1920, and the MSZDP announced that it 
would boycott the upcoming parliamentary elections. 
In the beginning of 1920, and especially after the new Hungar-
ian parliament officially reinstituted the monarchy and elected Miklós 
Horthy regent on 1 March, the Budapest authorities intensified their 
action aimed to retake Slovakia and Subcarpathian Ruthenia by force. 
Their chosen methods included encouraging the Magyar irredentists, 
playing on Slovak separatism, and wooing the Allies. Budapest's re-
vanchist plans created fertile conditions for the intensification of rela-
tions between the leftist émigrés and Prague. During a meeting with an 
Octobrist delegation on 31 March 1920, Beneš expressed his approval 
of Károlyi’s plan to unite all the exiles and bring down the Horthy re-
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gime. Next, Károlyi planned to restore the republic, carry out internal 
agrarian and social reforms, and develop stronger ties with neighbour-
ing countries. Beneš agreed to grant semi-official recognition to the 
Magyar émigrés and promised to provide asylum in the ČSR to other 
Hungarians if necessary. According to the Czech Minister, the most 
efficient way to exert pressure on Horthy would be an open rebellion; 
however, Beneš recommended postponing the operation until after the 
signing of a peace treaty with the Allies, in order to make sure that 
Czechoslovakia would not be accused of breaking the armistice 
terms.51 This honeymoon period between the Prague Castle (Hrad) and 
the Octobrists lasted until the summer of 1920. In the meantime, Ma-
saryk and Beneš continued to assure the Hungarian émigrés that an 
armed intervention against the counter-revolution in Hungary was pos-
sible;52 however, both Prague and Budapest eventually refrained from 
such military escapades. 
Once the Trianon Peace Treaty was signed on 4 June 1920 be-
tween Hungary and the Allies, including the ČSR, exiles realised that 
Prague began to view Budapest in a different light. Now Beneš aimed 
at a normalisation of official Hungaro-Czechoslovak relations. On 7 
June Masaryk made it clear to Jászi that although his sympathies re-
mained unchanged, he did not consider an active intervention against 
the Horthy regime any more. The disappointed Károlyi, in turn, began 
planning to diversify the émigrés' international connections: he wanted 
them to collaborate not only with Prague, but also with Belgrade 
(which, in Károlyi's opinion, could help arm the ‘anti-government’ 
against Horthy), as well as with the British Labour Party (which had 
initiated an international investigation of the 'white terror' crimes and 
of the subsequent boycott of Hungary by the Austrian transport enter-
prises in summer 1920) and, if possible, with Moscow and with the 
Slovak communists.53 Nevertheless, Jászi still hoped that Czechoslo-
vakia would remain a stronghold of the Magyar émigrés.  
Tensions between the Octobrists and the authorities in Prague 
kept rising. The autumn of 1920 saw the dissolution of the Hungarian 
émigré chancellery in Prague. Jászi, who continued meeting with 
Czechoslovak diplomats on a monthly and even weekly basis, criti-
cised the 'Czech passivity' and proposed – without success – to create a 
series of Hungarian paramilitary units in South Slovakia.54 After yet 
another audience in the Hrad in September 1920, Jászi concluded that 
Beneš would not act against Horthy without the support of the Western 
Great Powers.55 Another Czech blow to the Magyar exiles came in 
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December 1920, when the Czechoslovak authorities banned the distri-
bution of the leading exile newspaper Bécsi Magyar Újság (‘Vienna 
Magyar Newspaper’) in Slovakia, where most of its readers resided.56 
The symptoms of cooling in relations between Prague and the 
Magyar exiles were signs of a new trend in the Czech foreign policy. 
Beneš seemed to expect that the growing volume of trade between 
Hungary and Czechoslovakia would eventually induce the Horthy re-
gime to cease its irredentist propaganda in Slovakia, demilitarise the 
country, and definitely relinquish the idea of a Habsburg restoration. 
Further, Beneš hoped that a place could be found for Budapest within 
the framework of Prague's policy in Central Europe. The Czechoslo-
vak statesman even tried to persuade the Hungarian government to 
restore the republican form of government in Hungary.57 When Prague 
set its priority on developing relations with Budapest, Hungarian émi-
grés suffered the loss of an important foreign protector. As this policy 
was introduced in autumn 1920, Károlyi left the ČSR; and after the 
first bilateral Czechoslovak-Hungarian talks in Austria’s Bruck on 14–
15 March 1921, where Beneš personally met with Prime Minister Pál 
Teleki and his Foreign Minister, Gusztáv Gratz, desperate Jászi wrote 
to Károlyi, 'we have never felt so crushed'.58 
Very soon the newly achieved reconciliation between Prague 
and Budapest seemed to falter: in March 1921, Teleki and Gratz com-
promised themselves when the (ex-) King Charles IV Habsburg tried 
to retake power in Hungary. Beneš replied with a threat of an interven-
tion, and Charles IV chose to leave the country on his own accord. As 
the Czechoslovak Minister to Vienna, Flieder, noted, Magyar émigrés 
cheerfully welcomed the Czech’s anti-Habsburg stand, losing their 
fears that Prague turned back to the democratic values in foreign poli-
cy.59 
Smooth Budapest-Prague relations, however, were soon re-
stored. Teleki and Gratz resigned, and István Bethlen, who had been 
appointed Prime Minister in April 1921, continued the policy of rap-
prochement with Prague. In general, Bethlen's decision to give up both 
the irredentist propaganda and calls for a revision of the Treaty of Tri-
anon (at least temporarily) became the basis of the Hungarian policy of 
good neighbour relations on the Danube. 
The émigrés' hopes for a triumphant return to Budapest were 
momentarily rekindled in October 1921, when Charles IV undertook a 
second attempt to take back the throne. In reaction to this new restora-
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tion putsch, Beneš – who acted as both Prime Minister and Foreign 
Minister in 1921–1922 – began a mobilization and warned Bethlen 
that unless the Hungarian government dealt with the Habsburg claims, 
the Czechoslovak army would. The Magyar exiles decided to use the 
pressure exerted by the ČSR as a tool to bring down the counter-
revolutionary regime. Jászi and Garami urgently left Vienna for Pra-
gue. On 28 October, Beneš met with Jászi and explained that the ex-
iles' plan to remove Horthy would be difficult to realise due to the po-
sition taken by the Allies (who wanted Bethlen and Horthy to deal 
with Charles without any outside interference). To Jászi's disappoint-
ment, Horthy’s army defeated the Habsburg troops and took the king 
prisoner.60 
The aggressive Czech reaction to the Habsburg putsch, as well 
as the exiles' concurrent visit to Prague, led the Hungarian authorities 
to wonder if Beneš was harbouring imperialist plans.61 On 29 October 
1921, the Hungarian envoy in the ČSR, László Tahy, pointedly asked 
the ČSR Foreign Ministry officials if Prague intended to force an émi-
gré republican government on Hungary and create a 'Slavic corridor' 
leading into Yugoslavia.62 Beneš denied this; he also informed the au-
thorities in London (with whom the Hungarian government had shared 
their concerns) that any allegations that Prague wanted to institute an 
émigré government in Budapest were false.63 
Even though in practice Beneš took the side of Horthy in the 
Habsburg putsch, some Magyar democrats remained convinced that 
Prague's sympathies still lay with them. Right before the planned de-
thronement of the Habsburgs in Hungary (scheduled for 6 November 
1921), the chargé d'affaires of the Czechoslovak mission in Budapest, 
Karel Feistmantel, telegraphed to Prague that Horthy had resigned and 
the opposition was ready to form a new cabinet with Count János Had-
ik (a liberal legitimist who had been designated Prime Minister during 
the heady days of the Aster Revolution of 1918) as Prime Minister. 
The position of Minister of Foreign Affairs in this scheme would have 
gone to Garami.64 Even though the Regent's resignation turned out to 
be a hoax, the shadow cabinet formed by the legitimist Hadik and the 
socialist Garami proved to be long-lasting: the idea of replacing the 
Horthy-Bethlen tandem with that of Hadik and Garami kept resurfac-
ing during the consequent political crises of 1926 and 1931. 
In the early 1920s, many Hungarian exiles left the ČSR, while 
the anti-Horthyist opposition found refuge mainly in Austria. In late 
1921, Beneš instructed the new Czechoslovak envoy to Austria, Kamil 
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Krofta, to keep away from the 'dreamers' among the Magyar émigrés.65 
Thus it is not surprising that when Krofta held his first meeting with 
the leftist Hungarian politicians on 9 February 1922 in Vienna, Jászi 
was left with the impression that the new envoy was less cordial than 
his predecessor, Robert Flieder.66 It became ever clearer to the Octo-
brists that Prague preferred to reach reconciliation with the authorities 
in Budapest rather than help the Hungarian exiles return home.67 Even 
Krofta could not deny this: he admitted to Jászi that although the Hrad 
was sympathetic to the Hungarian oppositionists, Prague had to con-
sider Horthy's significant political weight.68 On 18 March 1922, Krofta 
informed Jászi that Beneš felt disappointed with the Octobrists exiles. 
The Czechoslovak Prime Minister was displeased that the predictions 
of Horthy's fall did not materialise and suspected that if the Hungarian 
émigrés were allowed to return to power, they would pursue a re-
vanchist foreign policy.69 
 
 
Bethlen's consolidation policy and the marginalisation of the anti-
Horthyist opposition (1921–1930) 
 
While curbing their ties with the émigrés, the Prague authorities 
sought not only to normalise relations with Budapest, but also to find 
leverage points among the opposition movements within Hungary. 
Throughout the 1920s, the MSZDP (which possessed large cells in 
Hungary and abroad) became Prague's privileged partner on the Hun-
garian political scene, with socialist exiles frequently acting as inter-
mediaries. In summer 1921, Garami – one of the leaders of the émigré 
wing of the MSZDP – helped Beneš to establish a rapport of trust with 
the so-called ‘liberal bloc’ in Budapest, which united assorted groups 
of anti-Horthyist socialists, radicals, industrialists, Catholics, Evangel-
icals, and freemasons. This new democratic front included both repub-
licans and monarchists. The members of the new bloc hoped to obtain 
financial aid from the ČSR in order to pursue their political activities 
and publish their newspapers.70 
It soon became clear that the plan to form a fronde in Hungary 
with Prague's assistance had serious faults. Horthyist agents provoca-
teurs succeeded in getting several leaders of the liberal bloc (such as 
Ádám Persián) arrested in summer 1921.71 Taking into account the 
danger of further persecutions by the counter-revolutionary authorities, 
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the opposition in Budapest chose to put their contacts with the ČSR on 
hold.72 
In late 1921, the home branch of the MSZDP – led by Károly 
Peyer, who had recently returned from exile – opted for a compromise 
with Horthy’s regime. Once the so-called Bethlen-Peyer Pact was 
signed on 21 December 1921, the party was finally legalised. The 
MSZDP pledged to act in accordance with the kingdom's laws and 
limit its propaganda and calls to strikes. The social democrats also 
vowed to cut their ties with the émigrés and spread Hungary-friendly 
propaganda abroad.73  
Nevertheless, the MSZDP continued cooperating with its for-
eign fellows, using them as intermediaries in its contacts with the 
ČSR. On the eve of the parliamentary elections in Hungary, which 
were to take place in May–June 1922, Garami, Vázsonyi, and Rassay 
began talks on the creation of a new democratic coalition. The atmos-
phere before the elections was tense, and the electoral campaign was 
accompanied by attacks against members of the opposition. The inac-
tion of the Budapest legal enforcement even gave rise to the joke that 
the evidence 'was intent on discovering the police'.74 Rassay repeatedly 
came to Vienna to meet with Garami and various Czechoslovak politi-
cians. Prague's connections to the opposition in Budapest caused sev-
eral scandals that almost led to a severing of diplomatic relations be-
tween Hungary and the ČSR. On 11 June 1922, Bécsi Magyar Újság 
published an interview with Beneš, in which he professed the ČSR's 
moral support for Hungarian democracy and the work done by the 
Hungarian émigrés. Beneš insisted that the émigrés needed to return to 
Hungary and prepare the country for reforms from the inside.75 Buda-
pest protested against this statement and threatened to cut off diplo-
matic relations with Prague. Beneš disavowed his interview, and the 
incident was resolved.76 
The 1922 elections resulted in success for the social demo-
crats: the MSZDP came in second after Bethlen's Unified Party in 
terms of the number of votes. Bethlen's party gained only twice as 
many votes as the MSZDP, it received 143 seats in the parliament, 
while the socialists got only 25. Considering the circumstances of the 
electoral campaign, the democratic and legitimist opposition leaders 
refused to recognize the legitimacy of the new parliament. In autumn 
the MPs from the MSZDP, the NDP, and Rassay's party created their 
own parliamentary faction – the Civic and Workers Union, which in-
cluded circa 50 MPs.77 
Hungarian Democrats and the Czechoslovak Authorities 
1919-32 
  
39
Beneš did not hide his satisfaction with the successes of the 
opposition in Hungary. On 12 July 1922, he once again assured Jászi 
of his continued support of the exiles and even recommended the es-
tablishment of a new émigré representation in Prague. Beneš also 
promised to investigate the assassinations during the electoral cam-
paign and to work on expanding the suffrage in Hungary.78 Meanwhile 
Czechoslovak involvement in the 1922 parliamentary elections attract-
ed wide public attention. The radical nationalists in Budapest suspect-
ed that the democrats had received funding from the ČSR and called 
them traitors,79 while the Foreign Office procured confidential infor-
mation that Prague had provided the MSZDP with a loan of 3 million 
Czechoslovak korunas for their electoral campaign. According to an-
other British source, Beneš had promised the Hungarian leadership 
that if a social-democratic government were to be formed in Budapest, 
the ČSR would be prepared to make territorial concessions to Hunga-
ry.80 It seems that this kind of offer was made by the Hrad more than 
once. 
Those democratic leaders who had not returned to Hungary 
used every opportunity to exert pressure on Horthy’s regime with the 
help of their international collaborators. In 1923–1924, Bethlen's cabi-
net found itself in great difficulty as a consequence of the post-war 
economic crisis. As the government desperately tried to obtain a relief 
from its burden of reparation payments (mostly by means of an inter-
national loan under the aegis of the League of Nations), the anti-
Horthyists turned to private diplomacy. In April 1923, Károlyi, Jászi, 
and Béla Linder suggested to the Yugoslav authorities that the Little 
Entente members should approve a loan for Hungary only if Budapest 
agreed to carry out democratic reforms.81 At first the opposition had 
great hopes for the Little Entente: when in September 1923 Bethlen 
held several meetings with Beneš in Geneva to discuss the terms of the 
international loan, rumours spread among the Budapest liberals that 
Beneš was going to demand the creation of a reconciliation cabinet, 
which would include members of the leftist opposition.82 
Beneš' report to the parliament in early November 1923, in 
which he mentioned the issue of the Magyar émigrés, elicited a lively 
reaction in Hungary. According to the account sent to Prague by the 
Czechoslovak envoy in Budapest, Hugo Vavrečka, the Magyar émi-
grés and their supporters at home were elated, believing that Beneš 
would not agree to a loan unless the exiles were allowed to return. 
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Radicals on the right, by contrast, were offended, convinced that Beth-
len was ready to tolerate interference in Hungary's internal affairs just 
to get the loan. They insisted that in return Prague needed to agree to a 
repatriation of Slovakia’s refugees, of whom there were 150 thousand 
in Hungary. Vavrečka added that Bethlen's own reaction to Beneš' 
speech was remarkably calm. Prime Minister assured the public that he 
had not made any promises in Geneva regarding internal policy or the 
émigrés' return, and that Beneš had not even made such demands. At 
the same time, while speaking with Vavrečka in private, Bethlen noted 
that some exiles could safely return to the country.83 
The issue of the Magyar emigration was indeed raised during 
the Czechoslovak-Hungarian negotiations in 1923. However, just as 
before, Prague was leaning towards a compromise in return for politi-
cal concessions. The talks between Bethlen and Beneš in Geneva took 
place largely thanks to the assurances given by one of Bethlen's close 
associates, a banker Filip Weiss. Weiss told to the ČSR Legation 
Counselor in Budapest, Jaroslav Novák that Prague had to cease its 
support of the MSZDP – which had no chance of obtaining power in 
the country anyway. In contrast, Weiss advised to start supporting 
Bethlen instead, who allegedly acted in full accordance with the Treaty 
of Trianon, kept the Hungarian army numbers low, and was prepared 
to curb the influence of Gömbös and his racist followers. In his report 
to Prague, Novak agreed that it would be worth helping Bethlen if 
such was indeed his policy and wrote in his report, 'Hungary is so soft 
now that you can mould it as you wish'.84 In August 1923, as the tech-
nical details of the Hungaro-Czechoslovak negotiations were being 
settled, Gömbös left the Unified Party and moved into open opposition 
to the government.85 
Bethlen and Beneš began discussing the issue of repatriation 
of the Magyar exiles at their very first meeting on 6 September 1923 in 
Geneva. According to Beneš, the return of the leftist émigrés to Hun-
gary would make it easier for Prague to agree to a loan for Hungary, 
since the Czechoslovak socialists maintained strong ties with the ex-
iles.86 Bethlen took a few days to consider the matter and finally re-
plied to Beneš on 9 September that he could not approve an amnesty 
for the émigrés without them first being tried in court. Still, Bethlen 
offered an alternative solution: if Hungary was to put a stop to irreden-
tist propaganda, then the neighbouring states – including the ČSR – 
would need to limit the émigrés’ propaganda against the Hungarian 
government. Beneš agreed and guaranteed that the Czechoslovak gov-
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ernment would take measures against the Magyar exiles as soon as 
friendly relations were established between Budapest and Prague.87 
The democratic opposition's hopes that the matter of the inter-
national loan would weaken the Horthy regime did not materialise: the 
negotiations were proceeding successfully without any significant sof-
tening to the counter-revolutionary regime. After the Bethlen-Beneš 
talks in Geneva, Krofta explained to Jászi  that 'we had to reach an 
agreement with Bethlen, because that is what the Allies and the 
League of Nations wanted.’88 In spite of such statements, the émigrés 
felt that Beneš had ‘allied’ with Bethlen and that 'the Little Entente 
seemed more eager to deal with Horthy than with the Magyar demo-
crats'.89 Although as late as January 1924 Károlyi was still convinced 
that 'with French help, Beneš managed to postpone the matter (the loan 
– A.P.) indefinitely',90 he subsequently changed his view. Thirty years 
later, Károlyi wrote in his memoirs that Beneš did not protest against 
issuing a loan to Budapest, which presumably proved that Prague was 
not truly opposed to Horthy's regime.91 
However, when the UK Labour Party (which had led the in-
ternational campaign against the 'white terror' in Hungary in 1920) 
formed the cabinet in January 1924, the Hungarian dissidents were 
once again filled with hope: perhaps the proposed international loan 
could still be used as a way to bring down the counter-revolutionary 
regime. On 1 February, the influential socialist Gyula Peidl told the 
official Czechoslovak newspaper Prager Presse that he was planning 
to hold talks with Ramsay MacDonald's cabinet about reversing the 
counter-revolution and allowing the exiles to return.92 Thanks to medi-
ation by Czechoslovak diplomats, a Hungarian leftist delegation soon 
arrived in London (Garami and Peidl from the MSZDP, and Rusztem 
Vámbéry from the Kossuth Party). The democrats insisted on the need 
to restore universal secret suffrage in Hungary, revoke the Numerus 
Clausus Act that limited the admission of Jews to universities, and en-
sure civic liberties.93 Károlyi and Jászi made similar suggestions to 
MacDonald in the summer of 1924. Nonetheless, the wishes of both 
delegations were largely ignored.94 
On 14 March 1924, Hungary and the Little Entente members 
signed two protocols in Geneva, confirming their acceptance of the 
Trianon terms, pledging to respect their mutual sovereignty and territo-
rial integrity and not to interfere in each other's internal affairs. Based 
on these agreements, the Little Entente states agreed to an international 
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loan of 250 million gold korunas for Hungary; Budapest received the 
first installment in summer 1924. Although Bethlen reassured the 
Hungarian parliament that the terms of the loan did not contain any 
internal policy stipulations, he still unexpectedly promised democratic 
reforms.95 Soon the Horthyist internment camps were dissolved, and 
the 'least important criminals' among the exiles were allowed to return 
and granted an amnesty.96 Nevertheless, this limited democratisation 
could not satisfy the leftist and liberal circles, which started to regret 
counting not only on Prague, but also on London. After the anti-
Horthyist oppositionists found themselves unable to gain reliable sup-
port over the course of the loan negotiations either in Czechoslovakia 
or in Labour-led Britain, they focused their hopes on France.97 
A great opportunity to test the opposition's pro-French orienta-
tion came in 1926, when it was uncovered that several of the top Hor-
thyist officials were involved in counterfeiting French francs and 
Czechoslovak korunas.98 The ČSR tried to blow out of proportion the 
'counterfeiters affair' in the media and at various political forums. In 
June 1926, Beneš admitted to his Czech colleagues that he considered 
the talks that followed the discovery of the counterfeiting operation a 
political success.99 Indeed, Bethlen almost resigned under the burden 
of evidence.100 As reported to Budapest by the Hungarian envoy in 
Paris, Baron Frigyes Korányi, 'the Little Entente, the Second Interna-
tional, and the League for Human Rights, together with certain interna-
tional Jewish circles, are doing their best to discredit the current re-
gime in the eyes of the whole world and to install a Károlyi-style re-
public in Hungary.'101 
In January 1926, Garami arrived in Paris together with another 
important MSZDP member, József Diner-Dénes. During their visit to 
the Ministry of the Foreign Affairs, both politicians tried to persuade 
the Quai d'Orsay officials to take harsh measures against Budapest in 
order to bring a new, 'unstained' government into power. This new 
cabinet, as they saw it, had to be led by János Hadik, who had already 
been suggested for the role in 1921. According to Garami and Diner-
Dénes, Hadik's cabinet, although composed of legitimists, would im-
mediately introduce a universal secret ballot. Furthermore, the gov-
ernment of Hadik would include proponents of a reconciliation with 
the Czechs and the Serbs. Diner-Dénes added that since Beneš had a 
good grasp of Hungarian internal policy, the ČSR could be very useful 
in putting pressure on the Horthy regime.102 However, the intrigues of 
the Magyar émigrés did not lead to Bethlen's resignation. In August 
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1926 Garami, distraught by this new failure, informed the Hungarian 
envoy in Paris of his desire to return to Budapest and participate in the 
work of the parliament.103 The December 1926 elections in Hungary 
proved that the influence of the democratic opposition had diminished: 
their number of seats fell, while that of the Unified Party rose to 
170.104 
The period 1926–1928 saw a significant improvement in the 
international standing of Horthy’s regime. After the League of Nations 
lifted the financial and military restrictions imposed on Hungary, Bu-
dapest signed friendship treaties with Rome, Ankara, Warsaw, and 
Sofia and launched a so-called ‘active diplomacy’. Bethlen managed to 
ameliorate his relations not only with Great Britain, but also with 
France and even the ČSR. The strengthening of Horthy’s regime 
pushed the émigrés to change their tactics. Garami and Buchinger – 
the leaders of the international branch of the MSZDP – sent out feelers 
to Budapest, hoping to arrange a compromise for the exiles’ return to 
Hungary. This initiative was apparently supported by the ČSR. In reac-
tion to the new position of the MSZDP, which had started to insist 
more actively on a revision of the Trianon peace terms, the influential 
Czech newspaper Národní politika wrote on 8 August 1929 that Pra-
gue's leftist sympathies remained unchanged: 'It is in our best interest 
to have Garami or Jászi rule in Hungary instead of Bethlen'.105 Beth-
len's government seriously considered the international potential of the 
MSZDP and in September 1929 decided to lift criminal charges 
against important social democrats.106 As a result, the ten-year exile of 
several leading members of the MSZDP finally came to an end: in No-
vember 1929, Garami and Buchinger safely returned to Hungary. As a 
proof of the new relationship format between the government and its 
opponents, Bethlen temporarily recognized the need for a 'democrati-
sation' and agreed to local elections based on a secret ballot.107 At the 
same time, as the Hungarian democratic core abroad melted away, 
Horthy’s regime reached the peak of its stability. 
 
 
 
 
The economic crisis and the renaissance of secret collaboration 
between the Hungarian opposition and Czechoslovakia (1930–32) 
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Several months after the Wall Street crash of October 1929, the global 
recession reached Europe. The Great Depression disrupted internation-
al trade and finance and threatened not only to ruin the shaky Hungari-
an economy, but to undermine the power of the Horthy-Bethlen tan-
dem. Conscious of the scale of the upcoming stagnation, Jászi (who 
had been living in the U.S. since 1924) wrote to Vámbéry on 12 No-
vember 1929, 'the Hungarian counter-revolution may turn into chaos... 
The October programme is more timely today than it was in 1918.'108 
Jászi's forecast was quite correct. As the prices for agricultural 
produce (which constituted the main Hungarian export) fell rapidly 
and foreign investment dried up, the Horthyist economy found itself in 
deep crisis. This was a perfect moment for a new mobilisation of the 
democratic opposition. In 1930, the social democrats annulled one of 
the compromise points of the 1921 Bethlen-Peyer Pact, which prohib-
ited public protests, and organised one of the largest manifestations of 
the interwar period: on 1 September 1930, circa 100 thousand people 
gathered in protest on the streets of Budapest.109 After the demontra-
tion, Bethlen became convinced that the ČSR had been instigating the 
opposition against Horthy's regime.110 The Hungarian envoy in Prague, 
Szilárd Masirevich, also concluded that Beneš – contrary to his pro-
claimed desire for a rapprochement with Hungary – was secretly plot-
ting to 'hang a so-called democratic government around our neck'.111 
The Hungarian authorities suspected that Czechoslovakia's main ob-
jective was to suppress the revisionist campaign in Hungary and to 
‘democratise’ Horthy’s regime.112 In the spring of 1931, international 
newspapers reported that Beneš had expressed a desire to see a more 
'accommodating government' in Budapest – one that would not press 
for a revision of the Treaty of Trianon but rather endorse Garami's po-
sition on the future of the Hungaro-Czechoslovak relations.113 
Whilst Hungary’s economy managed to endure the Great De-
pression with difficulties, Prague did not miss the opportunity to apply 
pressure to the beleaguered counter-revolutionary regime. In June of 
1930, the ČSR announced its intention to terminate the trade agree-
ment in Hungary; this gave rise to a customs war between the two 
states, which began in 1931 and lasted for five years,114 catastrophical-
ly damaging the Hungarian economy. Moreover, Prague expanded its 
connections on the Hungarian political scene. The Czechoslovak en-
voy in Budapest, Václav Pallier, named among open promoters of 
Hungaro-Czechoslovak reconciliation the social democrats, the liberal 
democrats, some legitimists (especially ex-Prime Minister István Frie-
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drich and ex-Foreign Minister Gusztáv Gratz) and an economist Ele-
mér Hantos.115 
Unable to reckon with the economic crisis in Hungary, István 
Bethlen resigned on 19 August 1931. Bethlen's resignation was met 
with jubilation in the Czechoslovak press: almost all newspapers wrote 
that the only way Horthy’s regime could deal with the crisis was to 
introduce a democratic form of government and reconcile with neigh-
bouring countries.116 The new Prime Minister Count Gyula Károlyi 
was more amenable to a rapprochement with the ČSR, and even listed 
it as one of his foreign priorities in his first speech in the parliament.117 
Károlyi hurriedly engaged into broad-scale diplomatic exchanges with 
the Czechs.118 
The economic hardships (budgetary cuts, failing earnings, and 
growing unemployment) undermined the Horthyist stabilisation. The 
opposition political parties recruited masses of new members. The 
widest popularity was enjoyed not by the MSZDP but the Independent 
Smallholder’s Party, which reportedly had 500 thousand followers.119 
Fearing the explosion of public discontent, a state of emergency was 
declared in September 1931 in the country. This measure did not pre-
clude the spread of the idea of the overthrow the Horthy regime by 
force if necessary. Most often calls for the use of weapons were heard 
from the nationalists and the Smallholders.120 
The Hungarian socialists and the legitimists also intensified 
their activity, but did not plan to overthrow Horthy through an armed 
insurrection. First of all, they strove to create a united front that would 
be able to push through democratic reforms.121 Additionally both the 
legitimists and the MSZDP demanded the government in Budapest to 
initiate a rapprochement with the ČSR.122 One of the first coordinated 
actions carried out by the new democratic anti-Horthyist front was to 
organise an international congress on Danubian cooperation in Buda-
pest. The goal of the congress was to popularise the idea of removing 
the high customs barriers that existed between the smaller states in the 
Central Europe and to bring them closer together politically. Czecho-
slovak envoy Pallier was approached with the idea for such an event 
by representatives of the Kossuth Party Pál Auer and Vámbéry in late 
November 1931.123 The conference – which took place in Budapest on 
11–12 February 1932 under the auspices of the Pan-European Move-
ment – was attended by delegates from Austria, Hungary, Czechoslo-
vakia, Romania, Yugoslavia, and Poland.124 
Aliaksandr Piahanau 
 
46
Throughout the winter of 1931–1932, the social democrats 
Garami and Buchinger, as well as the legitimists Gratz, Friedrich, and 
an economist Hantos made numerous trips to the ČSR.125 While Gratz, 
together with Hantos, became the most visible propagandists of the 
economic cooperation among the Danube nations (especially among 
Hungary, Austria and Czechoslovakia), their first discussions with 
Beneš did not bear fruit. On 19 September 1931 in Geneva, Hantos 
handed to Beneš, Krofta and the French diplomat André François-
Poncet a memorandum with a plan of economic rapprochement be-
tween Hungary, Austria, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia. Hantos as-
sured his interlocutors that he acted in accordance with the influential 
Defence Minister, General Gyula Gömbös. As Hantos explained, the 
general, in case he would be appointed Prime Minister, would proceed 
to the creation of a ‘democratic parliament’ in Budapest (but only if 
the regional trade will be restored and the Czechoslovak-Hungarian 
frontier will be modified).126 However, even though Hantos’ pro-
nouncements were positively covered by almost all Czech newspa-
pers,127 he failed to gain much confidence in Prague. One member of 
the Czechoslovak intelligence service described him as a clever ‘polit-
ical opportunist’ who did not have substantial backing in Hungary.128 
What was probably more important is that the general 
Gömbös, a well-known chauvinist, could hardly inspire the Czecho-
slovaks as a negotiating partner. However, as Gömbös’ position was 
reinforced by the resignation of Bethlen, the prospects of collaborating 
with him needed examination. In 1931, the Czechoslovak government 
learned with satisfaction that Gömbös consented to the reduction of the 
governmental financial aid to the Magyar parties in Slovakia and even 
prompted the dismissal of its leaders (such as OKSZP President Géza 
Szüllő).129 Moreover, Gömbös, like Beneš, was an ardent opponent of 
the Habsburg restoration and, apparently considered the economic co-
operation among Hungary, Austria and Czechoslovakia as ‘natural’.130 
When Gratz went to see Beneš in Prague on 12 December 
1931 (following a trip to Paris), the results of discussion were limited. 
The Czech leader rejected the project of the Upper Danube ‘triangle’ 
of Vienna-Budapest-Prague, stating that he preferred the rapproche-
ment that included the five regional states: the Little Entente members 
plus Austria and Hungary. Once such a union is realised, Beneš said, 
the revision of Hungary’s frontiers could be discussed.131 
In the meantime, Prague maintained more cordial relations 
with its old left-wing partners. Among their exchanges, the case rec-
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orded in most detail is that of Garami visit to Prague in early Decem-
ber 1931, followed by one to Paris. The central topic of his talks with 
Beneš was a plan of democratisation of Horthy’s regime. Garami 
hoped – just like he did in 1926 – that with French and Czechoslovak 
help he would be able to force Horthy to approve a transitional gov-
ernment, which was to be led by Hadik. János Hadik had pledged that 
if he was appointed Prime Minister, he would reform the counter-
revolutionary regime and build stronger economic and political ties 
with the ČSR. Beneš approved of the plan. Garami also reassured him 
that the new government would dissolve paramilitary organisations 
and pursue a demilitarisation of Hungary. However, in order to make 
this 'peaceful revolution' a reality (Garami insisted that Horthy would 
not leave 'without spilling blood', so he 'had to stay'), Hadik's cabinet 
would require the funds necessary to lift Hungary out of the financial 
crisis.132 On 21 December 1931, Garami, accompanied and the French 
socialist Léon Blum, were received by Prime Minister Aristide Briand  
who promised he would take the same position towards the Garami-
Hadik plan as Beneš.133 
The conspiratorial activities of the Hungarian opposition and 
their relations with the Czechoslovak Republic did not go unnoticed by 
the Budapest government. On 4 February 1932, Gyula Károlyi said in 
Parliament that he had no objections to the foreign travels of Friedrich 
and Gratz, but did not support them.134 Nevertheless in practice, while 
the foreign activities of Gratz were indeed tolerated, the Friedrich au-
dience with Beneš cooled dawn the Czechophile sentiments in the Uni-
fied Party circles.135 As one party member confessed to the Czechs 
later that Friedrich's meeting with Beneš might be compared with the 
potential reception in Budapest of the Czechoslovak general Radola 
Gajda,136 who was accused in 1931 of preparing a putsch. 
By spring 1932 it had became clear that most of the initiatives 
that had been proposed by the advocates of democratisation in Hunga-
ry had failed: both the Danubian integration project and that of a tran-
sitional government of Hadik were not realised. Although Prague 
maintained its contacts with the MSZDP and the legitimists, the recent 
reconciliation between the left and right branches of the anti-Horthyist 
opposition was bursting at its seams. In order to clarify the situation in 
Hungary, the Czech journalist Hubert Ripka – a trusted associate of the 
Hrad – made a visit to Budapest from 30 April–2 May 1932. He met 
with both dissident politicians and members of the Unified Party. In 
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his report Ripka concluded that 'the militant spirit of the opposition has 
dwindled' and that a fall of the regime seemed unlikely. 'A revolution-
ary coup is hardly imaginable', stated Ripka, adding that the Hungarian 
frondeurs placed excessive hopes in Beneš.137 
It seems that Prague abstained from further involvement into 
the struggle among different political groups in Hungary. Perhaps 
Hrad leaders viewed their old left-wing partners too weak, perhaps the 
personality of right-wing leaders aroused distrust. In any case, accord-
ing to Hungarian Foreign Ministry data, the ČSR began to cut its fi-
nancial aid to the 'parasitic Magyar exiles' starting in May 1932, while 
visits of non-governmental Hungarian politicians to Prague became 
ever more rare.138 It looks quite credible that Prague once again pre-
ferred to come in terms with the official Budapest, scarifying the inter-
ests of the Hungarian democrats. 
It could be speculated that the two governments – in Prague 
and Budapest – simultaneously agreed to cut their contacts with the 
opposition movements across their common frontier. Not only did 
Beneš refrain from further interference into Hungarian politics but also 
the Károlyi cabinet calmed down the Magyar opposition in Slo-
vakia.139 
Contemporaneously with the diminution of assistance of each 
other’s opposition circles, Hungary and ČSR were steadily improving 
their economic relations. A symptom of this was the fact that the ČSR 
and Hungary signed a compensation trade agreement.140 On 23 Au-
gust, giving a press conference, Prime Minister Károlyi presumptuous-
ly predicted that this freshly signed agreement ‘broke the ice’ between 
Hungary and Czechoslovakia and constituted a first step towards re-
storing the normal trade relations between them.141 Nevertheless, the 
ice was not broken on the Danube, and no significant revival of mutual 
trade happened. Facing failures in his foreign and internal politics, Ká-
rolyi resigned in September 1932, leaving the office to the general 
Gömbös. The new PM strengthened the regent's rule, overcame the 
acute crisis of the counter-revolutionary regime, and annulled the state 
of emergency. During the Gömbös era (1932–1936), collaboration be-
tween the Hungary’s democratic opposition and Prague greatly dimin-
ished. 
The convoluted and asymmetrical relations that were estab-
lished between Hungarian democratic circles and the ČSR in 1919 can 
create an impression that the opposition naively hoped for Prague's 
altruistic assistance against the regime of Miklós Horthy. Nonetheless, 
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faith in Czechoslovak democratic principles was not universal among 
the Hungarian opposition: seeing the oppression of the Magyar minori-
ty in Slovakia, they suspected that behind Prague's grand words of civ-
ic liberties and people's rule stood the strategic and economic interests 
of the ČSR. Correspondence, diaries, and memoirs written by the 
Magyar émigrés demonstrate that whenever Prague hesitated to show 
full support of the Hungarian democratic project, the exiles would take 
it as a sign that Beneš and Bethlen were secretly colluding behind the 
democrats' backs. Their opponents, the followers of Horthy, also 
doubted Prague's desire to install a democracy in Hungary – and so did 
a number of independent observers. For instance, as the fake franc 
scandal unfolded in January 1926, the Foreign Office official Miles 
Lampson wrote that 'the Little Entente was undoubtedly out for Beth-
len's blood': the military bloc was unwilling to see a strong personality 
at the head of the Hungarian government, since that would interfere 
with the Little Entente’s plans to spread chaos in Hungary. Lampson 
concluded that all talk of democratisation in Hungary was nothing 
more than an 'ideal mischievous proposal', which Prague never meant 
sincerely.142 Finally, the opponents of Horthy could not consider the 
democratisation as a panacea for all Hungarian troubles. For example, 
seeing the scale of Great Depression in his country, Mihály Károlyi 
wrote to Jászi in July 1932 that “it does not matter if Hungary is ruled 
by Horthy, Otto or a republican regime like in Czechoslovakia”, be-
cause a fairer political system would not assure much better economic 
situation”.143 
After the demise of Bethlen in 1931, Prague seemed to aban-
don its intensive cooperation with the Hungarian democratic move-
ments for the sake of winning the goodwill of official Budapest. In any 
case, Hrad had no serious partner among its old anti-Horthyist ac-
quaintances: while the leftist emigration lost much of its previous in-
fluence, its home wing was not powerful either. Another of the opposi-
tion groups – the legitimists, such as Friedrich or Gratz, also possessed 
no real influence in Hungary. On the contrary, the new Prime Minister 
Gömbös, proved to be a popular politician and showed some inclina-
tion towards cooperation with Prague. But the following years proved 
that Gömbös was more disposed towards collaboration with Berlin and 
Rome. 
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